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S E C R E T JAKARTA 001179

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [ID](#) [IR](#)

SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO CONVOKES AMBASSADOR ON IRAN;

ILL-PREPARED ON FEBRUARY 2 VOTE

REF: JAKARTA 1177

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe,
reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (S) Summary: President Yudhoyono (SBY) convoked the Ambassador to an extraordinary meeting January 31, attended by four ministers, to convey Indonesia's intention to decide its position on Iran's nuclear program when the IAEA Board of Governors meet on March 6. He conveyed concerns with respect to stability in the Middle East and the world economy along the same lines as Foreign Minister Wirajuda the previous day (reftel). When the Ambassador encouraged Indonesia to vote on February 2 to report Iran to the Security Council, SBY was caught unaware. The Ambassador briefed SBY on the P5 plus Germany position on reporting Iran on February 2 coupled with UNSC action delayed until March 6. After obtaining confirmation of the upcoming vote from Wirajuda, SBY replied that he would need a more complete briefing on the February 2 agenda, and closed by thanking the Ambassador for providing "more complete information" on the situation at hand. Clearly caught off guard about having to decide soon, and visibly not well briefed by his staff, SBY gave no concrete indication on how Indonesia will vote February 2. End Summary

12. (S) In a highly unusual event, President Yudhoyono (SBY) convoked the Ambassador the afternoon of January 31 (a local holiday) to convey the Government of Indonesia's policy on Iran's nuclear program. The President was accompanied by Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, State Secretary Mahendra, Cabinet Secretary Silalahi and foreign affairs adviser Djalal. The Ambassador was accompanied by PolCouns (notetaker). SBY had already met with the Russian Ambassador and with EU Ambassadors. He was scheduled to meet as well with the Chinese Ambassador.

Hope for a Resolution Before March 6

13. (S) Apparently poorly briefed and not aware of the importance of the upcoming February 2 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, SBY said that he hoped the Iran nuclear program issue could be resolved before the March 6 meeting would have to decide whether Tehran should be referred to the UN Security Council. He stressed the importance of Iran continuing to work the issue with the EU-3 and the Russians. He said Wirajuda conveyed the importance of positive action to the Iranians when the FM was in Tehran the previous week. SBY emphasized the need to avoid tensions in the Middle East, noting that there were strong emotional ties between some Indonesians and Iran. He also cited the possible effect of a resulting increase in oil prices resulting from any such tensions as deleterious to the economies of Third World nations such as Indonesia. Referring to a visit of an Iranian special envoy, SBY said that Indonesia made clear that it opposes the development of any nuclear weapon by Iran, and that Tehran must comply with all IAEA safeguard provisions. The Iranians must only pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. SBY closed by inviting the Ambassador to present U.S. views.

Iranian Blackmail Should Not Be Tolerated

14. (C) The Ambassador said the issue is neither religious nor regional but global. Iran acquired its technology illicitly from the A.Q. Khan network and never admitted to anything until the outside world managed to expose its activities. Only then was the IAEA allowed to inspect. Iran's cutting the seals effectively ended the EU-3 effort, and it has given lip service thus far to the Russian proposal. They have already contracted for the fuel for their nuclear power plant and do not need to enrich uranium themselves in order to supply it. The Ambassador reviewed Iranian behavior over the last few months, concluding that Iranian threats with respect to the price of oil constituted blackmail that the international community should reject.

The P5 and Germany will Refer Iran

15. (S) The Ambassador reported that the P-5 foreign

ministers and Germany worked late the previous night on the issue and said that there was a sense of frustration among them with Iranian behavior. At the end of the meeting, they issued a statement calling for the reporting of the steps required of Iran to the UNSC on February 2. The UNSC would take no further steps until the IAEA report of March 6. SBY reiterated that Indonesia would base its decision on the March 6 report.

What Will Indonesia Do February 2?

16. (S) When the Ambassador then encouraged Indonesia to join with the P-5 on February 2 to report Iran to the UNSC, SBY was taken aback. The Ambassador continued by noting that while there was a majority in favor of reporting Iran, Indonesia's vote would be important and we did not want to see Indonesia separate itself from the will of the international community. SBY turned to Wirajuda and asked whether there would in fact be a vote February 2 and the FM so confirmed. A discussion then broke out on what that vote would constitute. The Ambassador then read out the operative paragraph from the P5 1 statement about reporting Iran on February 2, and copies of the statement were passed out to each minister.

SBY: I Need More Information

17. (S) SBY then told the Ambassador that he would obtain the "concrete agenda" for the Feb. 2 meeting. The Ambassador pointed out that Iran would not have Russia or China to hide behind during that vote, and should not have Indonesia either. SBY said that he would obtain a further brief from his people. He closed by thanking the Ambassador for providing "more complete information" on the situation that would help the GOI prepare for the next IAEA meeting on February 2.
PASCOE

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